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The syndrome of autism was first systematically 
identified in the 1940's (Kanner 1943), and has been the 
focus of a broad range of work since that time (Rutter 
1999). Its symptomatology is seemingly diverse, and 
involves a rough division between 'personal' and 'non-
personal' tendencies. In the personal category are 
difficulties in understanding and interacting with other 
persons, socialisation, empathy and communication. In the 
non-personal category are difficulties in adaptability, 
occasional special abilities, and a wide range of 
peculiarities in learning, generalisation, pursuit of narrow 
interests, and so on. Some tendencies, such as 
peculiarities in the use of language, seem to span both 
categories.  
A central question in the theory of autism, 
therefore, is whether these two categories of impairment 
share a common pattern or character. It is true that 
received sets of diagnostic criteria (World Health 
Organisation 1993; American Psychiatric Association 
1994), drawn from empirical observation, give the 
impression of a split syndrome in which non-personal and 
personal tendencies occur together but are different in 
nature. However, we cannot simply trust the language 
games which inform the presentation of these 
observations: as Wittgenstein repeatedly argued, forms of 
words and 'analogies in language' can have the effect of 
obscuring both similarities and differences between things 
(Peterson 1990). The main thesis of the present paper is 
that there does exist a pattern common to these two areas 
of impairment, in that both involve dilogical structures.  
 
2. Dilogic 
For purposes of illustration, we start with a 
fictitious example from the film Rain Man. The main 
character in the film, who has autism, is crossing a busy 
road at a pedestrian crossing. Half way across, the sign 
changes from 'Walk' to 'Don't Walk', and the character 
stops and stands still (rather than hurrying to the 
pavement). This situation has an identifiable structure, in 
that two factors bear interactively on the same result. A 
legal factor ('I am at a pedestrian crossing and the sign 
says "Don't Walk"') suggests stopping, while a safety factor 
('I am in the middle of a road and the traffic is starting to 
move') suggests hurrying to the pavement. Such structures 
will be called 'di-logical', in the sense of involving two 
reasons, and the following terminology will be used to 
describe them.  
source (S) I am at a pedestrian crossing 
and the sign says 'Don't Walk' 
monological result (M) stop 
context (C) I am in the middle of a road 
and the traffic is starting to 
move 
dilogical result (D) hurry to the pavement. 
 
This structure can be read as 'Given S, M would 
follow by default, but given C as well, D follows in this 







What the character in the film does is to produce a 
monological response to this dilogical structure, ignoring 
the modulating influence of its context component 
(Peterson in press). In the present case, this modulating 
influence overrides the basic default of the monological 
response, but in other cases it may involve less radical 
adaptation or re-scheduling (indicating how, when or 
where to do something, whom to do it with, when to start 
and stop, how much of it to do, and so on).  
 
3. Non-Personal Cases 
In these terms, many tendencies found in autism 
consist in errors of adaptation to context, as in the 
illustrative example above. One case is the following of 
routines. The individual may have a procedure for getting 
up in the morning (S), and may follow this to the letter (M), 
despite the circumstance on this particular day of the need 
to leave early (C), which requires the adapted response of 
taking a quick shower instead of a bath (D). The individual 
may have a route for walking to school (S), and may insist 
on following this rigidly (M), despite the circumstance that 
there are deep puddles on the habitual side of the road 
(C), which could be avoided by walking on the other side of 
the road (D). The pattern is borne out by tests of executive 
function used in neuropsychology such as the Detour 
Reaching Task, the Wisconsin Card Sort Test and the 
Towers of Hanoi (Russell 1997). Once a rule (S) is 
understood, the individual with autism may follow it rigidly 
(M), despite indications (C) that execution should be 
delayed, terminated or temporarily suspended (D).  
A related problem exists in the differentiation of 
context. Here, something is encountered which is in fact 
the joint product (D) of a basic factor (S) and a modulating 
circumstance (C). But despite accumulating evidence, the 
person with autism may fail to articulate this structure, and 
may fixate on the original context as if it were essential. 
Thus in the case of echolalia, a word is first heard with a 
particular pronunciation. This is the joint product (D) of the 
basic word (S) and its pronunciation on that particular 
occasion (C), but the individual may persist as if this 
original modulation were essential. The word 'impolite', for 
example, having first been heard with heavy intonation as 
'im-pol-ite' may continue to be enunciated as such despite 
exposure to alternative pronunciations. Equally, a detail 
such as the colour of a cup may be treated as essential 
and the individual may refuse all others. And in 
classification, a species (D) which is a compound of a 




genus (S) and a differentia (C) may be treated as more 
important than the genus itself, so that the child with 
autism invents a neologism for 'red men's bicycle with 
racing handlebars' without using the general word 'bicycle'.  
In all of these cases, the odd behaviour at issue is 
situated within a dilogical structure, and the moment when 
we understand the behaviour is the moment when we 
locate it in relation to this structure. The child with autism 
walking through a puddle makes sense when we know that 
this is his usual route to school (and his actions are 
insulated from current context), and the child who refuses 
to use a cup at school makes sense when we learn that 
the cup used at home is of a different colour (and she has 
fixated on this contextual detail).  
 
4. Personal cases 
Problems of adaptation to context also appear on 
the personal side of the symptomatology of autism. In the 
case of tact, an individual may have something to say (S) 
and may simply say it (M), despite possibilities or signs of 
causing offence (C) which indicate, on this occasion, the 
adapted action of saying it in a moderated way or not 
saying it at all (D). Similarly, in the case of overinforming, 
the individual knows something (S) and downloads it in 
immoderate detail (M), despite the fact that only some of 
this is relevant to the audience (C), which suggests a 
filtered delivery (D). In general, a script or formula of social 
interaction (S) may be learned, but it may then be 
executed in an automatic or self-propelled fashion (M), 
despite contextual factors such as discouraging reactions 
from others (C) which indicate on particular occasions that 
execution of the script be moderated or terminated (D). 
Thus the person with autism can be insensitive to social 
contexts just as they can be insensitive to other contexts, 
and again this behaviour makes sense when we locate 
source and context within the larger dilogical structure.  
The problem, however, is worse than this. If we 
are to adapt to something, we need at least to know what it 
is, and people with autism show significant difficulty in 
working out what other individuals think and feel in the first 
place. This impairment in 'mindreading' is not simply a 
domain-specific 'blindness' to persons, since individuals 
with autism can be taught facts and rules of 'folk 
psychology' or 'theory of mind'. These may be applied in a 
non-adapted way, as above, but they are not 
incomprehensible in the first place. We therefore need to 
ask whether there exists an additional learning strategy 
which is available to neurotypicals but is impaired in 
autism. It is relevant here that some writers have argued 
that mindreading can be achieved through mental 
simulation: the process of using our own cognitive system, 
adapted as required, to simulate that of another person 
(Goldman 1989; Gordon 1986). The question, then, is what 
sort of adaptation is involved. A useful focus for analysis is 
the false belief task (Wimmer and Perner 1983) on which 
people with autism show significant impairment (Baron-
Cohen, Leslie and Frith 1985). A typical scenario, played 
out with dolls, goes as follows.  
Mummy and Maxi are in the kitchen. They have a 
bar of chocolate and they put it in location-1. Maxi then 
goes away to play with his friend. During this time Mummy 
takes the chocolate from location-1 and puts it in location-
2. Maxi then starts to come home, and wants to find the 
chocolate. 
Against this scenario, the participant in the 
experiment is asked the test question 'Where does Maxi 
think the chocolate is?'. As argued elsewhere (Peterson 
and Riggs 1999) what we need to do in order to answer 
this question is to ask ourselves the simple question 
'Where is the chocolate?' while imposing a mask or filter 
which says 'ignore the fact that the chocolate was moved'. 
In this way we operationalise Maxi's perspective, and we 
achieve a virtual simulation of his database without 
significantly disturbing our own. The present point is that 
this task has a dilogical structure: we have knowledge of 
the entire story (S), and by default we would say 'in 
location-2' (M) in answer to the simple question, however 
under the imposed filter (C), we answer differently and say 
'in location-1' (D). And in autism there is impairment in 
working out the dilogical response in this structure, and 
hence impairment in using this strategy in mindreading.  
This simulation strategy belongs to the broader 
category of cooperative cognition, where we also find 
dilogical structures and impairment in autism. In 
simulation, we need to think-with the other person, so as to 
work out what they believe. Equally, the individual with 
autism may learn to skate, but not to skate-with a partner. 
They may learn to play an instrument but not to play-with 
other musicians. They may feel, but not feel-with other 
people in an empathetic manner, and so on. As elsewhere, 
the problem is not blindness to a particular domain 
(people's beliefs, skating, playing music, emotion), but 
one-handedness in dealing with scenarios of a particular 
structure. This allows us to understand the originality which 
is sometimes noted in people with autism. Accommodation 
of context is not necessarily a good thing, and what is 
appropriate and cooperative may also be compromised 
and pointlessly conventional. Communities gain coherence 
through shared dilogic, by accepting assumptions which 
act as filters on thought and action, and progress may 
require detachment from these filters so as to 'think 
outside the box'. And here there is no absolute right or 
wrong: the monological style found in autism can be seen 
as closing the door to cooperation, opening the door to 
originality, or doing both at once.  
 
5. Conclusion 
We have identified the logic of a particular type of 
task, and we find this to be a common factor in the 
seemingly diverse symptomatology of autism. It is fair to 
make several qualifications here. --- The causes of the 
clinical syndrome of autism are biological, and these may 
produce effects which do not fit our pattern, including 
additional brain damage and impediments to speech and 
learning. People with autism show variable performance in 
the tasks discussed above, and the detail of exactly why 
they have difficulties with dilogical structures remains to be 
discovered (Peterson and Bowler 2000). Also, the pattern 
identified is not unique to autism, and any particular error 
or denial of dilogic may be produced by an individual who 
does not have this biological condition. --- The point 
remains, however, that a pattern exists which it is unhelpful 
to obscure. And this pattern suggests, in autism and non-
autism alike, that our grip on persons and our grip on 
things both rely on our grip on dilogical structures. This 
reliance may not be absolute: for any dilogical structure we 
could in principle incorporate the context into the source as 
an exception case, so as to produce a unitary but more 
complex rule or algorithm. However, in Wittgenstein's 
terms, such a 'superlative fact' is always open to 'surprises' 
which fall outside its scope. And given this, the attempt to 
explain autism in terms of inadequate 'theory of mind', like 
Socrates' attempt to explain judgement in terms of 
adequate definitions, is an enterprise which looks for the 
right thing in the wrong place.  
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